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Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has the highest growth rate in net international migration in 
the world. The reasons for this migration are investigated in this paper. First, a survey of 
the literature on the profile and determinants of international migration in SSA is given. 
Second, panel data on 45 countries spanning the period 1965 to 2005 are used to 
determine that the main reasons for international migration from SSA are armed conflict 
and lack of job opportunities. An additional year of conflict will raise net out-migration 
by 1.35 per 1,000 inhabitants and an additional 1 per cent growth will reduce net out-
migration by 1.31 per 1,000. Demographic and environmental pressures have a less 
important direct impact, but a more pronounced indirect impact on migration through 
conflict and job opportunities. In particular, the frequency of natural disasters has a 
positive and significant effect on the probability that a country will experience an 
outbreak of armed conflict. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a ‘migration hump’ or 
of persistence in net migration rates in SSA, and no evidence that immigration is 
causing conflict in host countries.  
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1 Introduction 
Roughly a billion people live in absolute poverty, with a significant proportion of 
these in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Over the last five decades economic development 
has stagnated in most of the continent. Africa is also the continent with the highest 
number of civil conflicts. It is already suffering from land degradation and freshwater 
scarcity, and climate change is expected to intensify these problems, causing more 
extreme weather conditions such as droughts and floods.1 Therefore international 
migration from SSA countries can be expected to increase. Indeed, current rates of 
international migration from SSA are already high, and have increased dramatically in 
recent years. Africa is the region with the second largest population of international 
migrants, and the region with the highest growth rate in net migration, exceeding 275 
per cent between 2000 and 2005. Concerns have been voiced about the loss of skilled 
labour (the ‘braindrain’) from the already poor countries (Adepoju 2006; Clemens and 
Pettersson 2008) and the potential that large-scale migration results in conflict (Smith 
2007; Reuveny 2007).  
Despite this pessimistic outlook, the reasons for international migration from SSA are 
not fully understood. According to a recent review, ‘there is a relative lack of studies 
on international migration in SSA’ (Lucas 2006: 337). More specifically, there is a 
lack of empirical studies into the determinants of international migration in SSA 
(Konseiga 2007; Lalonde and Topel 1997). Although an obvious determinant of 
international migration is conflict—and SSA has the largest number of refugees and 
internally displaced persons2—not much empirical work has been done to quantify the 
impact of conflict on international migration. As Lucas (2006: 365) points out, 
existing studies only proxy the effects of conflict, and have not considered ‘direct 
indicators of the nature, duration, and intensity’ of conflict. A third omission in the 
literature is the environmental factors and their relative importance as determinants of 
migration, in particular the impact of natural disasters. There is much anecdotal 
evidence on the extent and future potential of ‘environmentally forced migration'; 
however, little empirical evidence has been forthcoming on the significance and extent 
of ‘environmental migration’.  
The contribution of this paper is to address these shortcomings by empirically 
investigating the determinants of international migration in SSA. The remainder of the 
paper will proceed as follows. A profile of international migration from SSA is 
provided in section 2. Section 3 discusses the determinants of international migration, 
with particular attention to economic, conflict and environmental  determinants 
(including natural disasters). Section 4, using panel data from 1960 to 2005 on 46 
countries, contains an empirical investigation into the determinants of international 
migration in SSA. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
1   Reuveny (2007) discusses 38 cases of environmental migration events in recent years. Of these 15 
occurred in Africa, involving more than 20 million people. 
2   It is estimated that Africa accounts for one out of three refugees worldwide and around 13 million 
internally displaced persons (Black 2004). 2 
2  Profile of international migration from SSA  
2.1  The concept and role of international migration 
Migration has been defined as ‘the relocation of people within space that involves their 
permanent or temporary change of residence’ (Mafukidze 2006: 103). When an 
international border is crossed, it constitutes international migration, which can be either 
voluntary or forced. Voluntary migration is most often associated with entrepreneurs 
taking advantage of opportunities abroad, or with highly skilled and talented individuals 
moving to better remunerated employment opportunities elsewhere (e.g., Solimano 
2007). As such, voluntary migration can be said to reflect the operation of labour 
markets on a global level. In contrast, forced migration is seen as the international 
movement of people due to desperation. When such movement is for economic reasons, 
as when a particular economy is in crisis, the term ‘economic refugee’ is sometimes 
used. More properly, however, the term ‘refugee’ refers to people migrating 
internationally in order to flee political violence, war, civil conflicts, and persecution 
based on race, religion, nationality, or political opinions.3 When people flee violence, 
war, and persecution but do not cross international borders, they are internally displaced 
persons (IDPs). As is showed below, one of the features of migration in SSA is the high 
level of both refugees and IDPs.  
International migration, voluntary or forced, is widely recognized to be a fundamental 
adjustment mechanism in global labour markets and in household survival and welfare 
(Hatton and Williamson 2002; Adepoju 2006; Konsiega 2007; Solimano 2007). Views 
differ as to the impact of migration, with some considering it to have a negative 
influence on the development of poor countries, reinforcing the core-periphery patterns 
of international development (Mafukidze 2006: 105). Other researchers consider it to be 
positive in general for development (Stark 2004), while still others are more cautious 
and believe that the impact of international migration depends on how it is managed and 
whether or not it is mainly skill selective (Fratesi and Riggi 2007). What is important 
here is to recognize that international migration may affect a country’s GDP and 
growth, its population demographics and may have an effect on conflict (in both the 
sender and receiving countries) and on the pressure on natural environment.  
2.2  The extent of migration from SSA  
Data limitations hamper an accurate assessment of migration in SSA. Existing data may 
underestimate its real extent (Akokpari 2000; Black 2004). Data on international 
migration are hampered by the fact that borders in SSA are porous, and that official 
statistics fail to capture informal/illegal migration (Akokpari 2000). 
Available cross-country data collected by the UN Population Division, however, 
suggest that by 2005 in terms of the numbers of international migrants, Africa lagged 
behind only Europe and Central Asia. Of the estimated 190 million international 
migrants worldwide in 2005, 15.7 million were in SSA, the second largest number after 
Europe and Central Asia which account for 31.1 million. Despite having the second 
                                                 
3  See the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Available at: 
www.unhcr.org/1951convention/. 3 
largest migrant population, its rate of increase in net migration (275 per cent) is the 
highest of any region. 
Figure 1 depicts international migration (by the number of migrants per 1,000 
inhabitants) from SSA countries over the period 1960 to 2005. As Figure 1 shows, the 
relative extent of migration from SSA is the most substantial from the perspective of the 
small island states. Hence the largest net out-migration per 1,000 takes place in Cape 
Verde, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, and Sao Tomé and Principe (as well as 
Lesotho which, although not an island, is a small country). These small island states 
have generally not experienced armed conflict to the extent of some others (e.g., 
Mozambique and Angola), but are reckoned to be environmentally vulnerable or at risk. 
According to the environmental vulnerability index (EVI) of the South Pacific Applied 
Geoscience Commission (SOPAC) and the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP),4 Mauritius is classified as ‘highly vulnerable’, Cape Verde, Comoros and 
Lesotho as ‘vulnerable’, and Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tomé and Principe as ‘at risk’. 
Pelling and Uitto (2001) document the vulnerability of these small island states to 
natural disasters, identifying 65 natural disaster events that have impacted on Cape 
Verde, Comoros, Mauritius, and Sao Tomé and Principe between 1900 and 1997. 
Figure 1 also shows that once size is controlled for, the extent of in-migration to South 
Africa is not as large as is commonly believed, and that The Gambia and Gabon 
experience far greater immigration per 1,000 inhabitants. These are relatively stable 
coastal countries, unaffected by water scarcity to the same extent as some of the 
countries in the region.  
Figure 1 
Net migration per 1,000 inhabitants in SSA, annual average over 1960-2005 
 
Source of data:   WDI online  
                                                 
4   See www.vulnerabilityindex.net/ . 4 
2.3  Features of international migration from SSA 
International migration from SSA countries is characterized by (i) migration flows that 
are very volatile, and (ii) most international migration from SSA nations is destined for 
other SSA countries (intra-SSA). These features are due to the impact of conflicts, 
seasonal weather patterns (environmental pressure) and artificial borders. 
Consider the volatility of international migration from SSA. This can be seen in the fact 
that countries can alternate between net emigration to net immigration in the span of 
only a few years (Lucas 2006). In addition to the effects of natural disasters such as 
drought on the volatility of net migration, armed conflict also plays a significant role. 
SSA is the region with the highest number of refugees—more than 3.7 million in 2000. 
It is also reflected in the number of IDPs which at the end of 2006 stood at over 11 
million (IDMC 2007). It is noted that once hostilities cease (as also when droughts end), 
refugees are quite quick to return to their countries. A further reason for the instability 
in migration patterns is the seasonal nature of international migration, particularly in the 
Sahel (Konsiega 2007).  
Migration is also characterized in the SSA countries by the fact that most migration is 
confined to the continent (ECA 2006; Mafukidze 2006). One explanation is that a large 
proportion of the movement may be forced or seasonal migration, i.e., it is the intention 
of the migrants to return as soon as possible to their countries of origin. A second 
explanation may be the highly fragmented nature of nation-states in SSA, which has the 
highest number of countries per square kilometre in the world (Ndulu et al. 2007a: 102). 
Most of these states and their borders are highly artificial. The borders of SSA have 
been described as ‘imposed arbitrarily, defended illogically and blamed incessantly’ 
(Anon 1997: 17). As a result, these artificial borders may make international migration 
in the region seem much higher, as people do not need to travel great distances in order 
to be able to migrate internationally (Adepoju 2007).  
3 Literature  review 
In this section the literature overview of the determinants of international migration is 
discussed under four headings: economic determinants, demographic determinants, 
conflict and environmental determinants. 
3.1 Economic  determinants 
In the influential model of migration by Harris and Todaro (1970), the expected net 
economic returns from migration drive the decision whether or not to relocate. Thus 
potential migrants would consider differences in wages, as well as the probability of 
finding employment in a possible destination. In an extension to this literature, 
migration is seen as strategy at the household level, as opposed to the individual level, 
with both push and pull factors being taken into consideration (Akokpari 2000). Push 
factors would typically include declines in incomes and wages, rising unemployment 
and poverty, and a lack of basic amenities. Pull factors generally include better access to 
jobs, amenities, social services and education opportunities. Economic push and pull 
factors are widely considered as significant determinants in SSA, due to the fact that 5 
there has been overall economic stagnation in most of the continent since the 1980s, 
albeit with intra-SSA differences (Mafukidze 2006; Ndulu et al. 2007b). 
The extent to which these economic push and pull factors eventually lead to 
international migration may depend on supra-national influences, including immigration 
laws in potential destination countries (Akokpari 2000; Myburgh 2004). These 
influences include the characteristics of the country, its degree of regional integration 
and content of its trade agreements, as well as the influence of globalization/openness.  
3.2 Demographic  determinants 
Demographic determinants include the size, growth, density, and structure of a country 
or region’s population. Population size, growth, and density are most often associated 
with the pressures these exert on natural resources. These may be the impetus to conflict 
and competition over scarce and/or valuable resources (Hatton and Williamson 2001; 
2002). As such, this strand of the literature also emphasizes environmental factors—
such as environmental degradation and natural hazards—as causes of international 
migration (Oliver-Smith 2006). These are discussed in more detail in section 3.4.  
For the present, however, it can be noted that the structure of the population of a country 
may also be an important influence on migration. In this regard, as Hatton and 
Williamson (2002; also Lucas 2006; Adepoju 2007) point out, it is the younger people 
in particular who migrate more easily for economic reasons, as they have relatively 
more to gain in view of their longer expected lifespan. Hatton and Williamson (2002) 
include in their regression analysis a measure of the number of young people in a 
country’s demographic make-up as a determinant of international migration, and find it 
to be statistically very significant.  
A further aspect of the demographics is the social networks of the population. These can 
facilitate international migration by providing information, reducing travel costs, and 
helping assimilation (Smith 2007: 621). Once international migration has started, it may 
build up momentum on its own. Hatton and Williamson (2002: 559) describe the 
persistence in migration over time as the ‘friends and relatives’ effect: friends and 
relatives create a network that facilitates migration.  
3.3 Conflict   
It is generally accepted that political instability and armed conflict are among the most 
important determinants of international migration in SSA (Crisp 2006; ECA 2006; 
Mafukidze 2006; Adepoju 2007). Despite this recognition, very few studies so far have 
empirically analysed the impact of these factors on migration from SSA. In particular, 
none have used direct measures of political instability and conflict in relation to net 
migration. Using the stock of refugees in a country at the end of a particular year as 
dependent variable and various dummies for different types of conflict as explanatory 
variables, Hatton and Williamson (2001) investigate the effect of armed conflict on 
refugees. The authors capture the incidence of coups, guerrilla warfare, and civil wars, 
finding that these generate respectively 45, 30, and 64 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants. 6 
Traditionally there has been less emphasis in the literature on how the consequences of 
international migration in SSA contribute to conflict. Recently, however, a number of 
authors point to the possible role of migration as a cause of conflict in destination 
countries (Reuveny 2007; Smith 2007). According to Reuveny (2007: 660) it is possible 
that environmentally forced migration is more likely to result in conflict between 
migrants and citizens in the destination country, because the ‘scope and speed’ at which 
it can occur (as for instance, after a natural disaster) does not allow the migrants to be 
‘absorbed more slowly’. Smith (2007: 629) discusses how migrants are often seen as a 
burden, competing for jobs, resources, or even constituting a political threat. Salehyan 
and Gleditsch (2006) consider the possibility that migrants may ‘spread civil war’, and 
find that the probability of violent conflict is more than three times higher in migrant-
receiving countries. In section 4 a panel data model is used to determine the extent to 
which conflict contributes to net migration from SSA, and to investigate whether or not 
migration contributes to violent conflict. 
3.4  The natural environment and migration 
Natural environment is an important, and perhaps the oldest, determinant of migration 
and displacement of people. It affects migration through three channels, namely through 
(i) scarcity of water and land, (ii) conflicts over natural resources, and (iii) natural 
hazards and natural disasters. Climate change is expected to intensify these three 
factors. 
There are at least ten countries in SSA where more than 50 per cent of the population is 
severely disadvantaged with regard to water: Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Niger, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, and Swaziland. In another nine, almost a 
third of the population is subject to water scarcity (Le Blanc and Perez 2007). 
Furthermore, water scarcity has a seasonal profile with up to 25 per cent of the SSA 
population experiencing water stress for 10 months or more a year (Vörösmarty et al. 
2004: 13). Rainfall is unpredictable/irregular in many regions of Africa and may also be 
on the decline5 (Barrios, Bertinelli and Strobl 2003).6 In addition to water scarcity, most 
SSA countries are faced with land degradation (Semazzi and Song 2001; Bojö 1996).  
How quick the migration response is to these environmental changes is uncertain. 
Environmental degradation often takes place slowly, leading to gradual migration. 
Moreover, as Reuveny (2007) points out, migration is not the only or the first response 
of the population to environmental degradation. People can also choose not to migrate 
by accepting lower living standards, or they can adjust to the environmental changes. 
The migration decision may depend on the ability and resources of a community to 
                                                 
5   Declining rainfall is predicted to have serious negative effects on development. According to Barrios, 
Bertinelli and Strobl (2003), using cross-country panel regression methods, declining rainfall across 
SSA has had a significantly negative impact on economic growth rates: they estimate that it could 
explain up to 36 per cent of the gap in average per capita GDP between SSA countries and other 
developing countries. 
6   There are still differences among the predictions of whether and to what extent average rainfall across 
Africa will change due to global climate change. There is, however, more agreement, as reflected in 
the International Panel on Climate Change’s predictions, that the continent will get warmer, and that it 
will experience more extreme weather conditions. 7 
innovate and adapt (resilience), as well as the frequency and intensity of natural 
disasters.  
With respect to the resilience of a community, Raleigh and Urdal (2007) find empirical 
evidence that water scarcity and land degradation may increase the risk of conflict, but 
note that these effects are ‘weak’ and that economic and political factors play a much 
more substantial role in the risk of conflict.7 The difficultly with these findings is that 
conflict caused by resource scarcity may be due to inadequate institutions to mediate 
conflict and land degradation, so that the deep cause may not be environmental per se, 
but institutional (Tamas 2003). Poor SSA countries would be less able to manage 
potential conflict over resources than richer countries, and conflict is exacerbated in 
these countries by higher population growth and higher degrees of unequal access to 
resources (Homer-Dixon 1999; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Raleigh and Urdal 2007). 
It can be noted that after Asia, SSA in terms of natural disasters has had the largest 
number of victims from natural disasters between 1974 and 2003, with more than 350 
million affected (CRED 2004). Often these are due, or exacerbated by, environmental 
degradation, including changes in land cover due to human population/activity. Over the 
period 1974 to 2003, the annual number of natural disasters recorded in SSA increased 
more than 300 per cent. During this period, the countries most frequently hit by natural 
disasters included South Africa (56 occurrences), Ethiopia (54), Mozambique (46), 
Tanzania (38), Madagascar (35), Sudan (32), Nigeria (28) and Kenya (28).  
One of the major natural hazards faced by SSA countries is the highly variable and 
unpredictable climate patterns (Washington, Harrison and Conway 2004). Droughts are 
a major natural hazard: SSA had the largest concentration of droughts in the world 
between 1974 and 2003 (CRED 2004: 122), affecting more than 200 million people 
(Reuveny 2007). The link between natural disasters and migration is stronger than the 
link between resource degradation and migration because often the unexpected disasters 
allow less time for adaptation, thus increasing the likelihood that people will migrate. 
Natural disaster, such as a sudden drought, can also ‘trigger’ armed conflict in the battle 
for the control of natural resources (Hendrix and Glaser 2007). In section 4 empirical 
evidence to support this idea is given, suggesting that natural disasters can have a 
significant indirect effect on migration through its influence as a trigger for armed 
conflict. 
4 Empirical  study 
Having identified and discussed the most important determinants of international 
migration in SSA in the previous section, next I provide empirical estimates to quantify 
the relative impacts of these determinants on the decision to migrate.  
                                                 
7  Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) find empirical evidence of a causal relationship from GDP 
growth to civil conflict.  8 
4.1 Model   
The economic approach to migration is based on the optimization behaviour of rational 
economic agents. The decision, influenced by push and pull factors, depends 
fundamentally on the net economic benefits from migration. The economic approach is 
useful when one deals with voluntary migration, but less useful when dealing with 
forced migration (Reuveny 2007: 658). During conflict or natural disasters, the 
‘traditional cost-benefit analysis of routine migration is superseded by the need for 
survival and/or protection of assets’ (Ibánez and Vélez 2008: 659). Also, the incentive 
(option value) to wait, as in voluntary migration, may disappear. 
Therefore, in order to derive a function to estimate the determinants of international 
migration from SSA that would allow consideration of both voluntary and forced 
migration, this paper follows Ibánez and Vélez (2008) who in a recent study propose a 
random utility model for displacement migration. They derive and test this model for 
internal displacement in Colombia due to violence. This model is extended here in two 
ways: (i) by including rapid natural environmental degradation and disaster as causes of 
forced migration (Ibánez and Vélez include conflict/security concerns only) and (ii) by 
considering international migration (they focus on internal migration only). In this 
regard the model derived here assumes a two-country setting: country s and country m, 
with households/individuals migrating both from s to m, and from m to s. 
Basically the model states that any person or household, denoted by i, will migrate 
internationally if the utility from such a move exceeds the utility from remaining within 
a country; assume that households in country s will migrate if: 
   (1) 
with Uim the indirect utility from migrating to country m, Uis the indirect utility from not 
migrating and remaining in country s. 
In random utility models, indirect utility has a deterministic as well as random 
component (Ibánez and Vélez 2008). Thus the indirect utilities in (1) can be written as: 
    (2) 
and      
   (3) 
where   are the random components and   are the deterministic components 
to utility. 
The deterministic components reflect the main factors that individuals or households 
take into account when evaluating whether or not to migrate. Following the discussion 
in section 3, these will include relative wages or income opportunities (Wim vs Wis), the 
costs of migration (Cim), and the household’s risk aversion (Ri). When considering 
international migration, these costs will be affected by the fact that borders (Bim) need to 
be crossed. Social networks may mitigate these costs/risk aversion, which may be a 
function of lagged international migration (Lim). Furthermore, individuals or households 
will take into account political instability and violent conflict (Pim vs Pis) and natural 9 
hazards (Him vs His). It is assumed here, based on the discussion in section 3, that long-
term, gradual environment degradation and population pressure affect income 
opportunities, so that Wis = Wis(Ns, Ps) with Ns = environmental scarcity and Ds = 
population size and growth. Together (Ns,Ds) reflect demographic and environmental 
stress in a country.  
Following Ibánez and Vélez (2008) the deterministic utility function of the 
individual/household i in country j (j = s, m) can be written as: 
   (4) 
The probability of a household migration from country s is: 
 
Summing across all N-individuals/households i in country s at any given time results in 
total expected emigration from the country s to country m to be:  
   (6) 
With similar reasoning the expected emigration from country m to country s is: 
   (7) 
In any country j (j = s, m) the expected net rate of migration will be:  
   (8) 
If  Mj
n > 0  the  country  j will experience net immigration (immigration exceeds 
emigration) and if Mj
n <  0, the country will experience net emigration (emigration 
exceeds immigration). In this paper the interest is in identifying the variables in (8) for 
which Mj
n < 0.  
Equation (8) provides the basic framework for the empirical estimation in the remainder 
of the paper. It suggests that there are three ‘groups’ of time-varying determinants of net 
migration, namely economic opportunities and costs which include demographic and 
environmental stress (W,  C,  N,  D), conflict and political variables (P) and natural 
environmental hazards (H). There are also time invariant determinants such as 
household/country fixed effects and borders (and other fixed geographical/institutional 
features). In the discussion on data below, the various possibilities in measuring these 
variables are explained.  
(5) 10 
4.2  Data and estimators 
Data 
The variables, the data, and data sources are summarized in Table 1. The dependent 
variable in subsequent regressions is net migration, corresponding to Equation (8). 
Using gross migration data would have been useful, but are unavailable (Hatton and 
Williamson 2001). As shown in Table 1, net migration is the net total of migrants 
during the period, i.e., the difference between the total number of immigrants and 
emigrants. These data, made available by the UN Population Division, have been taken 
for 45 SSA countries,8 and are expressed as an annual average for the ten 5-year periods 
ending in 1960, 1965, 1970, 1980, 1985, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. 
A shortcoming in this paper that needs to be acknowledged is the quality and quantity of 
data, particularly on net migration. Already noted is the lack of gross migration data on 
the country level. The second aspect is, of course, the use of country-level data itself. 
The aggregated nature of migration data on a country level, and the fact that countries 
experience both inflow and outflows of migrants in any given year, reflecting the 
simultaneous push and pull factors, suggest that lower-level data, say on the household 
level, would be more appropriate. Third, as mentioned, there are difficulties in the 
accurate measurement of migration, so that the data used may not reflect the full extent 
of international migration. Fourth, existing data do not capture differences between 
short-term, temporary, or permanent migration, destination countries, nor of the 
composition of migrants (Lucas 2006).  
Data on the various independent variables are grouped in Table 1 according to the major 
types of determinants identified earlier: economic opportunities, environmental 
degradation and demographic pressures, political instability and conflict, natural 
hazards and others. 
As can be seen from Table 1, GDP per capita and GDP growth are used as indicators of 
the economic push and pull factors. GDP growth is generally used in the literature as a 
proxy for employment opportunities (e.g., Hatton and Williamson 2001; Lucas 2006). 
Furthermore, GDP per capita is postulated to be associated with a ‘migration hump’; 
that is to say, a nonlinear relationship is assumed between the level of GDP per capita in 
a country and the extent of international emigration. As Lucas (2006) explains, at low 
levels of per capita income, there are fewer people who can afford to overcome the 
fixed costs required for international migration. However, as the development level 
increases, people’s ‘expectations, desire and ability’ to migrate starts to increase 
(Adepoju 2007: 14). Thus a positive relationship can be expected between GDP per 
capita and net migration. At higher levels of per capita income, there are sufficient local 
opportunities for people to refrain from migrating. By including per capita GDP, we are 
able to test whether such a ‘migration hump’ exists in SSA; such evidence is currently 
lacking (according to Lucas 2006). 
                                                 
8   The countries included are Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, DR Congo, Rep. Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tomé and Principe, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe. Due to data limitations Equatorial Guinea, Mayotte, and Seychelles are excluded. 11 
Environmental degradation and demographic pressures are measured here by the degree 
of water scarcity and the proportion of the country’s young population (between 15 and 
24 years of age), following Hatton and Williamson (2001) in the latter. In this paper the 
percentage of land under irrigation is (an imperfect) proxy for water scarcity. In 
countries with less irrigation, there are perhaps less water resources available, and thus 
also a greater dependency on rainfall. Other possible indicators, such as the water stress 
index (see Ohlsson 1999) or the EVI (of SOPAC) were also considered, but these 
 
Table 1 
Summary of variables and data sources 
Measures  Description  Sources of data 
Variable: Migration     
Net migration 
per 1,000 inhabitants 
Difference between emigration and immigration per 
1,000 of a population. Provided as annual average 
over 5-year periods 1960-65, 1965-70, 1970-75, 
1975-80, 1980-85, 1985-90, 1990-95, 1995-2000, 
2000-05 
UN Population Division; 
Available at: 
www://esa.un.org/unpp  
   
Variable: Economic opportunities and costs of migration   
GDP per capita  Obtained as average GDP in constant 2000 
international $ divided by total population per year 
over five-year intervals, 1960 to 2005. Time varying. 
WB World Development 
Indicators online 
 
GDP growth  Average annual growth in real GDP over five year 
intervals 1960 to 2005. Time varying. 
WB World Development 
Indicators online 
   
Variable: Demographic pressures and environmental degradation   
Young population  Proportion of population aged 15 to 24. Time varying. UN Population Division 
Available at: 
www://esa.un.org/unpp 
Land under irrigation  Measure the water scarcity in a country, taken as 
the hectares of arable land under irrigation. With 
less land under irrigation a country may have less 
water resources and may be more dependent on 
rainfall/susceptible to drought. Time varying. 
WB World Development 
Indicators online 
   
Variable: Political instability and conflict   
Armed conflict 
 
The number of years during a 5-year period when 
there was civil war in a country, defined as at least 
25 battle-deaths. Time varying. 
UCDP PRIO Armed Conflict 
dataset: Available at: 
www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets
/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/
   
Variable: Natural hazards   
Disasters  The total number of natural disasters in a country  
in a 5-year period between 1974 and 2003. Time 
varying. 
CRED (2004). 
   
Variable: Others   
Landlocked  A dummy variable = 1 if a country is landlocked  
and = 0 if not. Can be interpreted as an indicator of 
environmental stress, of ruggedness, as well as of 
openness to the world economy. Time invariant. 
Africa Research Programme 




indicators are only available for a single year—and were not found to induce any 
improvement in the results.  
Population density is a potentially important determinant that not only affects economic 
opportunities but results in environmental stress. Following from the discussion in 
section 3, population density can therefore be seen as a proxy for land scarcity (Raleigh 
and Urdal 2007) and real wage pressure (higher population density can reduce wages) 
(Hatton and Williamson 2001). Potential problems exist in using population variables in 
a regression model on net migration: first, population variables are not likely to be 
endogenous. In other words, migration is likely to affect population variables, so that 
there is likely to be strong bi-directional causality between the variables. This 
consideration, as well as the fact that the UN Population division makes use of 
population growth patters in estimating net migration rates,9 has influenced the decision 
not to use population growth rates in this paper as an independent variable in the 
regression analysis.  
As far as political instability and conflict determinants are concerned, Table 1 shows 
that these are measured directly by the number of years during the 5-year period that 
were characterized by armed conflict (as measured by more than 25 battle-related 
deaths). It is generally accepted that armed conflict is an important determinant of out-
migration, and one would expect to find a significantly negative relationship between 
violent conflict and net migration in the sample.  
The effects of being subjected to natural hazards are measured here by the number of 
natural disasters that have taken place in a country during the period, but bearing in 
mind that not all natural hazards inevitably result in natural disasters. The data are taken 
from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). It does not 
measure the intensity of the disaster in terms of either physical or monetary damages 
caused, or in terms of casualties. Whilst these are important, the frequency of disasters 
may be more important from the point of permanent emigration rather than once-off 
large disasters. 
Finally, Table 1 indicates that a category of ‘other’ variables is also applied in the 
regression analysis, which includes whether or not a country is landlocked. People in 
landlocked countries may have greater difficulties in migrating internationally, if the 
aim is to migrate out of Africa. Also, to the extent that landlocked SSA countries may 
be experiencing more economic and environmental difficulties, migration from 
landlocked to coastal countries may be significant.  
Estimating equation and estimators 
Given that panel data methods are to be used, the implicit Equation (8) can be written in 
the following more explicit form: 
it i it it u c x m + + = β  (9) 
                                                 
9   There is a very strong positive linear relationship between population growth rates and net migration 
rates in the sample. The correlation coefficient between these is 0.81. 13 
For i = 1,…N and t = 2,…T and where mit = net migration from country i over period t; 
xit = a 1 ×K vector of explanatory variables which includes the variables set out in 
Table 1. As indicated in that table, some of these vary over t; ci = unobserved country 
characteristics that are constant over the time period, and influence mit; and   
uit = a random error term with the usual properties.  
The preferred estimator in this case is a dynamic panel data estimator, specifically the 
‘system GMM’ estimator. This is because such an estimator allows one to deal with 
three issues which complicate the analysis with typical linear estimators such as OLS 
and 2SLS in the present case. First, one can expect important country-specific effects 
(ci) to operate, which may cause omitted variable bias. Second, as was clear from the 
discussion in sections 2 and 3, the relationship between net migration and some of its 
expected determinants is complex, with the possibility of reverse causality. For instance, 
while population pressure can lead to out-migration, its very occurrence may act as a 
valve to relieve population pressure in a subsequent period. Similarly, net migration 
may affect economic opportunities by influencing GDP growth through changes in 
skilled labour. Third, migration is a dynamic process. In the case of SSA, it was noted 
that past levels of migration may influence current levels because of either persistence 
effects (networks, or ‘family and friends’) or instability (returning migrants). To allow 
for these factors, it is necessary to include lagged values of net migration in the 
estimation equation. 
To show how the system GMM (generalized method of moments) estimator can be 
used, Equation (9) can be re-written in dynamic format as the following AR(1) model: 
it i it it t it it it u c x m m m m + + + + = Δ = − − − β α γ
'
1 1   (10) 
This can be written more conveniently as: 
it i it it t it u c x m m + + + + + = − β α γ
'
1 ) 1 (    (11) 
where Δmit = the difference in net migration over the period and γt = period-specific 
intercept terms, and uit as defined earlier. 
Taking first-differences of (11) gets rid of the time-invariant components, ci  which 
addresses the problem of omitted variable bias: 
it it it t it u x m m Δ + Δ + Δ + + = Δ − β α γ
'
1 ) 1 (   (12) 
However, first differencing (11) introduces a further problem as it will result in the 
regressors becoming correlated with the error term (for instance Δmit-1 depends on uit-1). 
To avoid this, instrumental variables need to be used for the endogenous regressors. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose using the lagged levels of the regressors (e.g., mit-j) 
as instruments to avoid endogeneity—and derive a ‘difference’ GMM-estimator. 
Subsequently it has been shown that when the number of time periods used is relatively 
small, the lagged levels of the regressors might not be good instruments for differenced 
variables, especially if the latter follows a random walk (e.g., Bond, Hoeffler and 
Temple 2001). Following contributions from Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998), it has now become standard to use a ‘systems’ GMM estimator which 14 
adds to the difference equation in (12) a further equation in levels, with the instruments 
in first differences. The system-GMM estimator therefore consists of estimating both 
(11) (which is in levels), using lagged differences (e.g., Δmit-j) as instruments, and (12) 
(which is in first-differences), using lagged levels (e.g., mit-j) as instruments (see 
Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998). A benefit of this systems-equation 
approach as opposed to the ‘difference GMM’ estimator is that one can now include 
time-invariant regressors which would otherwise by differenced out (Roodman 2006). 
4.3 Regression  results 
Table 2 contains the ‘system GMM’ regression results. It can be seen from the 
diagnostics that the overall specification seems to be sound. The number of instruments 
does not exceed the number of groups, the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions 
on the instruments cannot reject the null that these restrictions are valid, and the 
Arellano-Bond test cannot reject the null of no second-order autocorrelation. 
Furthermore, Table 2 reports both the normal z-values (column 2), the z-values obtained 
from estimating robust standard errors (column 3) and the coefficients from the two-step 
system-GMM estimator (column 4). 
Table 2 
System GMM estimates of the determinants of net migration in SSA 














Net migration (lag) 
GDP per capita 
GDP growth 
GDP growth (lag) 
Population density (lag) 
Population 15-25 yrs (lag) 
Land under irrigation 
Natural disasters 
Incidence of armed conflict 
Landlocked 
 -13.91   (-0.66) 
 -0.24    (-2.43)** 
 0.003    (1.13) 
 0.82    (6.82)** 
 0.49    (2.33)** 
 -0.13    (-1.70)* 
 0.93    (0.84) 
 -0.03    (-0.06) 
 -0.73    (-1.63) 
 -1.35    (-2.19)** 
 -4.30    (-1.08) 
 -13.91    (-0.59) 
 -0.24    (-2.24)** 
 0.003    (1.05) 
 0.82    (3.26)** 
 0.49    (2.86)** 
 -0.13    (-1.29) 
 0.93    (0.81) 
 -0.03    (-0.08) 
 -0.73    (-1.57) 
 -1.35    (-2.39)** 
 -4.30    (-0.82) 
 -13.40    (-0.95) 
 -0.21    (-2.46)** 
 0.003   (1.17) 
 0.59    (3.25)** 
 0.30    (2.36)** 
 0.006   (0.14) 
 0.72    (0.98) 
 -0.30    (-1.53) 
 -0.64    (-1.65)* 
 -1.54    (-5.22)** 
 -3.26    (-0.73) 
Diagnostics      
No. of observations 
No. of groups 










  Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions:  
χ
2 (8) = 10.73 p =0.22 
(accept null that over-
identifying restrictions 
are valid) 
Arellano-Bond test for 
second-order 
autocorrelation  
prob > Z = 0.85  
(accept null of no 
autocorrelation)  
Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions: χ
2 
(12) = 8.33,    p =0.40 
(accept null that over-
identifying restrictions are 
valid) 
Note:  z-ratios in parentheses. * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, 
respectively. 
Source:   Author’s calculations 15 
The results in Table 2 show that the variables which are consistently significant across 
columns 2 to 4 are the past levels of net migration, GDP growth, and armed conflict. 
Population density is significant when the one-step (non-robust) estimator is used, and 
so is natural disasters when the two-step estimator is used. The signs on the coefficients 
are as expected. 
The results in Table 2 suggest that in forced migration, conflict and the quest for job 
opportunities are the most significant determinants of international migration in SSA. 
Armed conflict and GDP growth have the greatest impact on international migration, 
with the sizes of their respective impacts roughly similar. An additional year of conflict 
will raise net out-migration by 1.35 per 1,000 inhabitants while an additional 1 per cent 
growth will reduce net out-migration by 1.31 per 1,000. The latter results show the 
importance of taking lags into consideration: without lagged GDP growth, the impact of 
an additional 1 per cent growth on migration is only around 0.8 per 1,000, which is 
closer to other estimates in the literature (e.g., Hatton and Williamson 2001) where 
static estimation methods are used. 
Past levels of migration have a significant influence on current levels. The fact that the 
sign on lagged migration is negative suggests a situation where there is cyclical or 
return migration rather than persistence in international migration flows. This confirms 
the patterns of volatility of international migration in SSA. It is also consistent with 
migration that is mainly forced. It can also be noted that GDP per capita is insignificant 
and enters with a positive sign, implying the absence of a ‘migration hump’ in SSA. 
Population density is only significant in column 2 and has a negative (but relatively 
small) impact on net migration. Given the discussion in section 3, this is as expected. 
The reason for the negative coefficient on population density could reflect either lower 
relative wages, and/or population pressure on resources. Both reasons would result in a 
negative coefficient.  
Overall, the results in Table 2 support the widely shared view that international 
migration from SSA is largely forced in nature, due in particular to armed conflict and 
political instability. It also supports the notion that economic and demographic factors 
lead to high rates of mainly voluntary migration. The role of natural hazards and more 
gradual environmental degradation and pressure on natural resources are more difficult 
to discern. Natural disasters enter with the right sign, but the coefficient just misses 
being statistically significant at the 10 per cent level when using the one-step estimator. 
Under the two-step estimator, the impact of natural disasters, however, is significant. 
Proxies for water scarcity (land under irrigation) and for being landlocked are 
consistently negative. Using direct measures such as the water stress index or the EVI 
also turns out to be insignificant. To the extent that population density is found to be 
negatively associated with net migration, it may be an indication that resource scarcity 
can matter. However, the coefficient on population density is small, so that one may 
conclude that unless natural disasters, environmental degradation, and resource scarcity 
substantially affect either conflict or job opportunities, their impact on emigration from 
SSA countries is not likely to be substantial.  
Finally, some further remarks on the relationship between natural disasters, 
environmental degradation and resource scarcity and international migration are in 
order. As was mentioned, there is only slight indication from Table 2 that natural 
disasters may have an influence on migration in SSA. It is statistically significant in the 16 
two-step estimator, with a coefficient size that suggests that one additional natural 
disaster per year could lead to an increase in net out-migration of 0.6 per 1,000. Apart 
from population density, which can be seen as reflecting pressure on resources, other 
determinants related to environmental degradation and resource scarcity, such as 
irrigation, and water stress/environmental vulnerability index (not reported) are not 
found to be significant. However, these variables may affect conflict and job 
opportunities (GDP growth) and, as such, have an indirect impact on migration. In the 
Appendix further regression results are reported to investigate these potential channels, 
which confirm that natural disasters act as a trigger for conflict in SSA, and that natural 
disasters and reduced arable land may depress economic growth. 
The Appendix includes two tables: Appendix Table A1 presents the results of a probit 
regression for the determinants of whether or not a country will experience conflict in a 
given year. The dependent variable is constructed as a dummy variable which is equal 
to 1 if a country experienced armed conflict in a particular year, and 0 if otherwise. 
Appendix Table A2 contains the system GMM results of the determinants of the 
number of years of conflict (intensity) in SSA. The independent variables in these 
regressions are based on the conflict in SSA literature (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 1998; 
Welsch 2008). Thus in addition to natural disasters, these regressions include variables 
such as GDP, GDP growth, ethnic fractionalization (using the index in Alesina et al. 
2003) and in the case of the probit regression, the EVI of a country (the proportion of 
land under irrigation is also used alternatively, but this turned out to be insignificant as 
in the system GMM estimation). Moreover, the variables applied in the regression 
results reported in the Appendix include the rate of net migration to test for the 
possibility that migration may influence conflict in a country. 
The results in the Appendix show that in the outbreak of armed conflict, a probit 
regression finds that GDP per capita, ethnic fractionalization and the number of natural 
disasters are the most significant explanatory variables. Countries with a higher GDP 
per capita will have less probability of civil war; conversely countries with higher 
degree of ethnic fractionalization have a higher probability. These results are consistent 
with the extensive literature on civil conflict in SSA. What is novel in the case of the 
present results is the significant influence of natural disasters. Thus, as shown in 
Appendix Table A1, the number of natural disasters in a country raises its probability of 
being in civil war. This may be consistent with the hypothesis discussed in section 3 that 
natural disasters can act as a ‘trigger’ for conflict over scarce resources. From Appendix 
Table A1 the elasticity can be calculated: this indicates that an additional one disaster 
per annum (the average in the sample is 3.6) raises the probability that the country can 
fall into civil conflict by 1.75 per cent.  
Appendix Table A2 shows that as far as the intensity of civil conflict is concerned 
(measured by the number of years of conflict), GDP growth reduces the intensity of 
conflict, and conflict in the previous year (lagged conflict) prolongs it (i.e., there is 
some persistence). Being landlocked also raises the duration of a country’s conflict. One 
explanation for the significance of the landlocked variable is that it may reflect the fact 
that if institutions are lacking and conflict over natural resources do take place, it has a 
particularly detrimental impact on countries with a ‘low degree of openness’, such as 
Africa’s landlocked nations (Arezki and Van der Ploeg 2007). Furthermore, Appendix 
Table A2 indicates that the number of disasters does not affect the duration/intensity of 
conflict, supporting the notion of natural disasters as the ‘trigger’ for conflict. Also, as 17 
shown in Table A1, the net migration rate (lagged here to avoid problems of reverse 
causality) has no significant affect on conflict. 
Finally, the effects of natural disasters, environmental degradation and resource scarcity 
on GDP growth (which is generally seen as a proxy for job opportunities) in SSA are 
estimated. The detailed results (not reported here for the sake of brevity) find that the 
effect of the environmental variables on GDP growth is generally insignificant. Only the 
number of natural disasters is noted to be statistically significant with a one-period lag. 
Once institutions, geography and conflict are controlled for, the only environmental 
variable noted to be significant is the amount of arable land. This means that decreases 
in arable land, for instance through soil degradation, will lead to a decline in GDP 
growth. It is also observed that armed conflict has a statistically significant negative 
contemporaneous association with GDP growth, consistent with bi-directional causality 
between conflict and GDP growth. Finally, no evidence is found to suggest that 
migration has a statistically significant impact on GDP growth in SSA. 
5 Concluding  remarks 
SSA already has the world’s highest population of refugees, the second highest 
population of migrants, and the highest rate of growth in international migration. In this 
paper empirical evidence is presented to suggest that conflict and the quest for job 
opportunities are the most significant determinants of international migration in SSA. 
Specifically, armed conflict and GDP growth have the largest impacts on international 
migration. The sizes of their respective impacts are comparable: an additional year of 
conflict will raise net out-migration by 1.35 per 1,000 inhabitants and an additional  
1 per cent growth will reduce net out-migration by 1.31 per 1,000. The size of the latter 
effect is significantly higher than the effect found earlier, for instance, by Hatton and 
Williamson (2001). Environmental factors are also important. It is noted that one 
additional natural disaster per year can lead to an increase in net out-migration of 0.6 
per 1,000. Apart from population density, which can be perceived to reflect the pressure 
on resources, other determinants related to environmental degradation and resource 
scarcity, such as irrigation, and water stress/environmental vulnerability index are not 
found to be significant. 
It has to be emphasized that disentangling the separate effects of these reasons for 
international migration is difficult. They interact in complex ways. Thus it is established 
that environmental variables affect conflict and job opportunities (GDP growth), and 
that conflict affects GDP growth. Specifically, the number of natural disasters in a 
country raises its probability of civil war. This is consistent with the view that natural 
disasters can act as a ‘trigger’ in the conflict over scarce resources. Also, in the absence 
of controlling variables, natural disasters are noted to have a negative impact on GDP 
growth, but with a period lag. Reductions in arable land, as would occur due to soil 
degradation, are also noted to depress GDP growth. The main impact of environment 
factors on migration from SSA countries can thus be said to occur through their impact 
on conflict and economic growth. 
Finally, what policy implications emanate from these findings?  18 
First, it has to be acknowledged by policymakers that international migration in SSA is 
both an adapting and mitigating strategy in the face of conflicts, natural disasters, and 
economic stagnation. Governments in recipient SSA countries should formulate 
strategies to better accommodate the inflows so as not to worsen the plight of people 
who have been largely forced to migrate. 
Second, if confrontation can be limited further and if the continent can reverse its 
economic stagnation, the rate of out-migration from SSA countries will be reduced or 
perhaps even turned around—without significant efforts by governments to entice 
migrants back. 
Third, SSA’s growing (and predominantly young) population is putting pressure on the 
natural environment. Furthermore, global climate change is likely to lead to an increase 
in the frequency of natural hazards. It is noted here that both of these factors can fuel 
conflict, depress economic growth, and subsequently raise emigration. One policy 
response, also advocated by Le Blanc and Perez (2007), would be to attempt to reduce 
population growth. A further option is to reduce and reverse the extent of land 
degradation. More generally, however, policymakers, donors and the international 
development agencies should take care to strengthen state capacity and invest in 
building community resilience in SSA that could contribute towards reducing the 
likelihood of natural hazards developing into natural disasters.  19 
Appendix  
Appendix Table A1  
Probit regression results for the likelihood of armed conflict in SSA and the impact of natural disasters, 
environmental degradation and migration on the likelihood of conflict 







GDP per capita 
GDP growth 
Ethnic fractionalization 
Environmental vulnerability index 
 -0.020    (-1.03) 
 0.05    (1.86)* 
 -0.0003    (-1.83)* 
 0.01    (0.35) 
 0.91    (1.78)* 
 0.002    (0.82) 
Pseudo R
2 0.06 
Note:  z-ratios in parentheses. * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, 
respectively. 
Source:   Author’s calculations 
 
 
Appendix Table A2  
 System GMM regression results for the determinants of the intensity of armed conflict 




Coefficient (Robust SE) 
 
Intercept 
Incidence of armed conflict (lag) 
Natural disasters 
GDP per capita 
GDP growth 
Ethnic fractionalization 
Net migration rate (lag) 
Land under irrigation 
Landlocked 
 -7.7    (-1.57) 
 0.75    (3.30)** 
 0.02    (0.31) 
 -0.0005    (-0.82) 
 -0.08    (-4.08)** 
 9.04    (1.45) 
 0.006    (-0.22) 
 .12    (1.21) 
 4.55    (2.31)* 
Diagnostics   
No. of observations 
No. of groups 




  Arellano-Bond test for second-order autocorrelation 
prob > Z = 0.85 (accept null of no autocorrelation)  
Note:  z-ratios in parentheses. * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, 
respectively. 




Adepoju, A. (2006). ‘Leading Issues in International Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa’. 
In C. Cross, D. Gelderblom, N. Roux, and J. Mafukidze (eds), Views on Migration in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Proceedings of an African Migration Alliance Workshop. 
Pretoria: HSRC Press, 25-47.  
Adepoju, A. (2007). ‘Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa: Background paper 
commissioned by the Nordic Africa Institute. Lagos, 14 September. Available at 
www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/08/88/66/730473a9.pdf. 
Akokpari, J. K. (2000). ‘Globalisation and Migration in Africa’. African Sociological 
Review, 4 (2): 72-92. 
Alesina, A., A. Devleeschauer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat, and R. Wacziarg (2003). 
‘Fractionalization’. Journal of Economic Growth, 8: 155-94.  
Anon (1997). ‘Africa’s Bizarre Borders’. The Economist, 342 (8001): 17. 
Arellano, M., and O. Bover (1995). ‘Another Look at the Instrumental Variable 
Estimation of Error-Components Models’. Journal of Econometrics, 68 (1): 29-51. 
Arellano, M., and S. Bond (1991). ‘Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte 
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations’. Review of Economic 
Studies, 58 (2): 277-97. 
Arezki, R., and F. Van der Ploeg (2007). ‘Can the Natural Resource Curse be Turned 
into a Blessing? The Role of Trade Policies and Institutions’. IMF Working Paper 
WP/07/55. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Barrios, S., L. Bertinelli, and E. Strobl (2003). ‘Dry Times in Africa: Rainfall and 
Africa’s Growth Performance’. Munich Personal RePEc Archive Paper 5705. 
Black, R. (2004). ‘Migration and Pro-Poor Policy in Africa’. Working Paper C6. 
Brighton: Sussex Centre for Migration Research. 
Blundell, R., and S. Bond (1998). ‘Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in 
Dynamic Panel-Data Models’. Journal of Econometrics, 87 (1): 115-43.  
Bojö, J. (1996). ‘The Costs of Land Degradation in Sub-Saharan Africa’. Ecological 
Economics, 16 (2): 161-73. 
Bond, S., A. Hoeffler, and J. Temple (2001). ‘GMM Estimation of Empirical Growth 
Models’. Working Paper. Oxford: Nuffield College, University of Oxford. 
Clemens, M. A., and G. Pettersson (2008). ‘New Data on African Health Professionals 
Abroad’. Human Resources for Health, 6 (1) doi: 10.1186/1478-4491-6-1 (article in 
press). 
Collier, P., and A. Hoeffler (1998). ‘On the Economic Causes of Civil War’. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 50 (4): 563-73. 
CRED (2004). EM-DAT. Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, 
Brussels: University of Louvain. 21 
Crisp, J. (2006). ‘Forced Displacement in Africa: Dimensions, Difficulties, and Policy 
Directions’. Background paper 4 prepared for the CeSPI and SID International 
Conference on Migration and Development, 6-8 July, Rome. 
ECA (Economic Commission for Africa) (2006). International Migration and 
Development: Implications for Africa. Executive Summary. Addis Ababa 
(www.uneca.org/popia). 
Fearon, J. D., and D. Laitin D. (2003). ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’. American 
Political Science Review, 97 (1): 75-90. 
Fratesi, U., and M. R. Riggi (2007). ‘Does Migration Reduce Regional Disparities? The 
Role of Skill-Selective Flows’. Review of Urban and Regional Development Studies, 
19 (1): 78-102. 
Harris, J. R., and M. P. Todaro (1970). ‘Migration, Unemployment and Development: A 
Two-Sector Analysis’. American Economic Review, 60 (1): 126-42. 
Hatton, T. J., and J. G. Williamson (2001). ‘Demographic and Economic Pressure on 
Emigration out of Africa’. IZA Discussion Paper 250. Bonn: IZA. 
Hatton, T. J., and J. G. Williamson (2002). ‘Out of Africa? Using the Past to Project 
African Emigration Pressure in the Future’. Review of International Economics, 10 
(3): 556-73.  
Hendrix, C. S., and S. M. Glaser (2007). ‘Trends and Triggers: Climate, Climate 
Change and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa’. Political Geography, 26 (6): 695-
715. 
Homer-Dixon, T. F. (1999). The Environment, Scarcity and Violence. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Hulme, M., R. Doherty, T. Ngara, M. New, and D. Lister (2001). ‘African Climate 
Change: 1900-2100’. Climate Research, 17 (2): 145-68. 
Ibánez, A. M., and C. E. Vélez (2008). ‘Civil Conflict and Forced Migration: The Micro 
Determinants and Welfare Losses of Displacement in Colombia’. World 
Development, 36 (4): 659-76. 
Konseiga, A. (2007). ‘Household Migration Decisions as Survival Strategy: The Case of 
Burkina Faso’. Journal of African Economies, 16 (2): 198-233. 
Lalonde, R. J., and R. H. Topel (1997). ‘Economic Impact of International Migration 
and the Economic Performance of Migrants’. In M. R. Rosenzweig and O. Stark 
(eds), Handbook of Population and Family Economics, vol. 1B. Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 799-847. 
Le Blanc, D., and R. Perez (2007). ‘The Relationship between Rainfall and Human 
Density and its Implications for Future Water Stress in Sub-Saharan Africa’. 
Ecological Economics, doi 10/1016/j.ecolecon.2007.09.009 (article in press). 
Lucas, R. E. B. (2006). ‘Migration and Economic Development in Africa: A Review of 
Evidence’. Journal of African Economies, 15 (2): 337-95.  
Mafukidze, J. (2006). ‘A Discussion of Migration and Migration Patterns and Flows in 
Africa’. In C. Cross, D. Gelderblom, N. Roux, and J. Mafukidze (eds), Views on 22 
Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa: Proceedings of An African Migration Alliance 
Workshop. Pretoria: HSRC Press, 103-29. 
Miguel, E., S. Satyanath, and E. Sergenti (2004). ‘Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: 
An Instrumental Variables Approach’. Journal of Political Economy, 112 (4): 725-
53. 
Myburgh A. (2004). ‘Explaining Emigration from South Africa’. South African Journal 
of Economics, 72 (1): 125–51. 
Ndulu, B. J., L. Chakraborti, L. Lijane, V. Ramachandran, and J. Wolgin (2007a). 
Challenges of African Growth: Opportunities, Constraints and Strategic Directions. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Ndulu, B., S. O’Connell, R. Bates, P. Collier, C. Soludo, J-P. Azam, A. Fosu, 
J. Gunning, and D. Njinkeu (eds) (2007b). The Political Economy of Economic 
Growth in Africa 1960-2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Ohlsson, L. (1999). ‘Environment, Scarcity and Conflict: A Study of Malthusian 
Concerns’. Göteborg: Department of Peace and Development Research, University 
of Göteborg.  
Oliver-Smith, A. (2006). ‘Disasters and Forced Migration in the 21st Century’. 
Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social Sciences. Online at 
http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/ (Access 13 May 2008).  
Pelling,  M., and  J. Uitto (2001). ‘Small Island Developing States: Natural Disaster 
Vulnerability and Global Change’. Environmental Hazards, 3 (2): 49-62. 
PRIO (International Peace Research Institute Oslo) (2007). ‘Transnational 
Entrepreneurs in an African Outpost: Chinese Migrants in Cape Verde’. 
www.prio.no/page/preview/9244/41184.html (accessed 22 May 2007).  
Raleigh, C., and H. Urdal (2007). ‘Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and 
Armed Conflict’. Political Geography, 26 (6): 674-94.  
Reuveny, R. (2007). ‘Climate Change-induced Migration and Violent Conflict’. 
Political Geography, 26: 656-73. 
Roodman, D. (2006). ‘How to Do Xtabond2: An Introduction to Difference and System 
GMM in Stata’. CGD Working Paper 103. Washington, DC: Center for Global 
Development  
Salehyan, I., and K. S. Gleditsch (2006). ‘Refugees and the Spread of Civil War’. 
International Organization, 60 (2): 335-66. 
Semazzi, F. H. M., and Y. Song (2001). ‘A CCM Study of Climate Change Induced by 
Deforestation in Africa’. Climate Research, 17 (2): 169-82. 
Smith, P. J. (2007). ‘Climate Change, Mass Migration and the Military Response’. 
Orbis, Fall: 617-33. 
Solimano, A. (ed.) (2007). The International Mobility of Talent: Types, Causes, and 
Development Impact. Oxford: Oxford University Press for UNU-WIDER. 
Stark, O. (2004). ‘Rethinking the Brain Drain’. World Development, 32 (1): 15-22. 23 
Tamas, P. (2003). ‘Water Resource Scarcity and Conflict: A Review of Applicable 
Indicators and Systems of Reference’. UNESCO, PC-CP Project.  
Vörösmarty, C. J., E. M. Douglas, P. A. Green, and C. Revenga (2004). ‘Geospatial 
Indicators of Emerging Water Stress: An Application to Africa’. AMBIO, April.  
Washington, R., M. Harrison, and D. Conway (2004). ‘African Climate Report: A 
Report Commissioned by the UK Government to Review African Climate Science, 
Policy and Options for Action’. London: Department for International Development. 
Welsch, H. (2008). ‘Resource Abundance and Internal Armed Conflict: Types of 
Natural Resources and the Incidence of New Wars’. Ecological Economics, doi 
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.01.004 (article in press). 
 